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DIOCESAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES: THE CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVE
WILLIAM F. MCCARTHY*
The assessment of risk and return reminds me of a story
told by the late Cardinal O'Fiach, Primate of Ireland. The story
was about an old fisherman from the Arran Islands who came
into Galway to go to confession. The fisherman said to the
priest, "Bless me father for I have sinned. It has been three
years since my last confession." The priest responded, "My good
man, you can't wait three years to go to confession. You have an
obligation to make your Easter duty once a year." The fisherman
replied, "Father, I'm out there in the Arran Islands and I came in
here to Galway to find a priest. I've got to get into my little boat
and I've got to row all the way across the water and the winds
blow and it's awful." The priest, in turn, said, "But now there's
an airplane that comes in twice a week. A little airplane that
comes in and lands in Galway. You can get on that airplane and
come in here and go to confession." With that, the fisherman
replied, "Father, I can't use that airplane to come in here to go to
confession. For venial sins it's too expensive and for mortal sins
it's too dangerous!"
Just like the old fisherman, business corporations constantly
reconcile risk and expense. Indeed, business corporations regu-
larly question whether they should incorporate some portion of
their enterprise into a separate entity to insulate the remaining
. Member of the Massachusetts Bar. Partner in Ropes & Gray, Boston, Massa-
chusetts. A.B. cum laude, College of the Holy Cross, 1967; J.D. cum laude, Harvard
Law School, 1970.
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portions from risk.' While a structure which utilizes multiple
corporate entities is more expensive, at least in the sense that
there are administrative costs involved in maintaining separate
entities, multiple corporate entities are a viable way of providing
resiliency in case major losses arise in one discreet portion of a
multi-faceted enterprise.
Traditionally, church organizations have not had a similar
need to reconcile risk and expense. For that reason, they have
felt free to lump all assets and activities of the diocese into one
or just a few corporate entities. Today, however, there are sev-
eral common intra-diocesan arrangements which may be ad-
versely impacted by a large uninsured judgment against the
single diocesan entity, and the impact is not simply financial.
Disruption of intra-diocesan arrangements may potentially sour
the attitude of those parishes whose money may seem to be at
risk-the contributions from parishioners that they expect to be
devoted to their own parish. Disruption may also harm clergy
morale due to concerns over provisions for their retirement and
health benefits. Disruption may even draw the attention of the
attorney general where funds of one charitable entity are com-
promised by the financial difficulties of a separate entity which
was holding funds for the benefit of the first entity.
To avoid disruption by large uninsured judgments, religious
organizations need, at an early point in time, to focus on the re-
siliency provided by multiple corporate structures. If risks from
one part of the overall activity of the Church arise, then the
other parts of the Church can be relatively well-insulated from
adverse impact. Thus, the proper focus is not on avoiding liabil-
ity generally; rather, the objective should be to limit the adverse
impacts of liability in the short and long runs.
Typically, a civil dispute between two parties involves a
long, drawn out series of legal battles; however, ultimately, the
liabilities are going to be resolved. Usually the matter is settled.
Nevertheless, what impact will these legal battles have on an or-
ganization before the matter is finally resolved? For example, is
there a risk that bank accounts will be attached at the com-
mencement of a suit resulting in significant disruptions of the
diocese's activities? Similarly, what impact will this risk have on
'See Adolph A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
343, 343 (1947) (noting that single, large scale businesses are conducted through
constellation of corporations controlled by single holding company).
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the diocese's ability to finance elderly housing projects or any
other church projects requiring outside financing?
Major projects may be adversely impacted by a significant
contingent liability. For instance, if a contingent liability man-
dates that a financial statement footnote be written in severe
terms, there may be a significant impact for the whole organiza-
tion, particularly where the contingent liability could exceed the
fair valuation of the corporation's assets. At that point, it is dif-
ficult to modify the corporate structure because of the possibility
that the corporation may later be held to have been insolvent,
with the result that the transfer of an asset into a separate cor-
poration will be subject to attack as a fraudulent conveyance.!
There are a few concepts that a religious organization may want
to consider to address these issues in advance.
TRUSTS IN THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT
If an asset in possession of the debtor is not property of a
debtor, and is held only for the benefit of another person, argua-
bly a transfer of this asset does not represent a transfer of prop-
erty of the debtor.3  Why do I say arguably? Because even
though the corporation sole may regard itself as holding assets in
trust for another entity, for example, cash in either a loan fund
or an investment type fund, the actual legal relationship be-
tween the corporation sole and the other entity may be that of
debtor and creditor.4 Although there may be a perception of a
trust relationship, in the absence of actual documentation of
such a trust relationship, it will be difficult to establish that the
asset was held under a real or constructive trust or similar ar-
rangement.5
A recent example of a court refusing to recognize assets as
held in an actual trust in the business context is In re Amdura
2 See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4-8 (1986); 11 U.S.C. § 548
(1995).
3 See 2 DANIEL R. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 349 (6th ed., West
1994) (citing In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991) (observing that property in
which debtor only had bare legal title but no other interest cannot be recovered for
benefit of bankruptcy estate)).
See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 599-601 (abr. ed., West 1993).
5 There is a strong presumption that funds in the possession of a debtor are, in
fact, the legal property of the debtor. "[T]he burden rests on the claimant to estab-
lish the original trust relationship." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541-75 (15th ed.,
1995).
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Corporation.' In Amdura, a parent corporation and its subsidi-
ary pooled all of their liquid assets into what is called a concen-
tration account, which was held in the parent's name.7 After
both the parent and subsidiary went bankrupt, the subsidiary's
trustee sought to recover the subsidiary's share of the concen-
tration account.8 The court held that the trustee did not meet its
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that some of
the funds were the property of the subsidiary.9 Particular em-
phasis was given to the fact that the parent corporation pos-
sessed "legal cognizable indicia of ownership." ° Consequently,
the subsidiary's rights were those of an unsecured creditor and it
had no rights in the funds themselves."
Thus, without careful documentation of trust arrangements
between affiliated corporations, it may be difficult to establish
the existence of such a trust relationship. 2 This problem arises
usually after an account has been attached or after the parent
corporation has gone into bankruptcy. Before any such attack is
made on that account, it is wise to document formally the rights
of the parties. One can argue that no transfer occurred at the
time of documentation. If, however, a transfer of assets to an
affiliate is made before a corporate entity files a bankruptcy
case, a trustee may still seek to recover the distribution as a
preference. 3 Some courts have held that if this property was
held in a constructive trust, even an informal trust relationship,
the "transfer" is not a transfer of property by a debtor. 4 Other
' 167 B.R. 640 (D. Colo. 1994), aff'd, 75 F.3d 1447 (10th Cir. 1996).





1 See 11 U.S.C. § 542 (1995). Section 542 states that the party attempting to
prove that funds, now attached are, in fact, not the property of the debtor must do
so by clear and convincing evidence. Id. See Evans v. Robbins, 897 F.2d 966, 969
(8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing "presumption of continued possession," which creates
presumption that debtor who holds back assets from his trustee continues to hold
them illegally (quoting Marin v. Ellis, 33 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1948))).
13 See 2 COWANS, supra note 3, at 389 (stating that right of recovering prefer-
ence from entity which received preferential transfer stems from Section 550(a)(1)
of Bankruptcy Code).
14 See 4 COLLIER, supra note 5, at 541-74 (citing American Serve Co. v. Hender-
son, 120 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1941)); First Presbyterian Church v. Rabbitt, 118 F.2d
732 (9th Cir. 1940) (stating that estate will hold property in a trust, which is valid
under terms of Code, subject to outstanding interest of beneficiaries).
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courts have held that preferential transfers cannot be justified
on the basis of a constructive trust theory."
Nevertheless, it is best that trust relationships be recognized
and formalized. One which should define the process as a for-
malization of pre-existing, informal relationships, rather than
the creation of new entities and/or transfers of property away
from a threatened entity. The objective is to insulate the maxi-
mum amount of property held for specific purposes from the
claims of potential creditors. Therefore, if one entity has obliga-
tions to many other separate entities, it is imperative that its
relationships, whether as custodian, trustee, or otherwise, be
formalized so that, when and if such relationships are scruti-
nized in the context of its financial insolvency, there is very clear
contractual or other documentation that proves how these rela-
tionships arose and exist.
Even if these arrangements between entities are properly
categorized as debtor-creditor relationships, practitioners should
address the issue before problems arise. Restructuring a debtor-
creditor relationship usually does not give rise to a fraudulent
conveyance, because the pre-existing debt is fair consideration
for any transfer of property. However, such a restructuring can
give rise to a preferential transfer under Section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code. But preferential transfers are recoverable
only if made within ninety days prior to bankruptcy (or one year
in the case of a transfer to an insider). Generally, if one year
passes after a relationship has been formalized, the transactions
involved in the formalization are no longer vulnerable to attack
as preferences.
Also keep in mind that, under Section 303(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a charitable corporation cannot be the subject of an
involuntary bankruptcy petition. Because such a corporation
will become a debtor in a federal bankruptcy case only if it de-
cides to do so, it controls the timing of any filing, and could delay
15 But cf. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 393. In truth, courts can only reject the con-
structive trust theory by stating that the facts do not give rise to a constructive
trust at all. For if a trust is recognized, a court would not be free to allow the assets
held in trust to be distributed to other creditors. Id. In fact, "It]he constructive trust
allows the plaintiff to recover an asset even if he has no legal title to it, so long as
that asset is regarded as 'belonging' to him in an equitable sense." Id. See 4
COLLIER, supra note 5, at 541-76 ("[If it cannot first be shown that a trust has been
created, there is no necessity for inquiry as to whether the property can be identi-
fied or traced.").
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filing to permit the federal preference period under Section 547
to run out. This would relegate any attack on the basis of pref-
erence theory to state law, if any.
While preference issues generally arise in the federal bank-
ruptcy context, some states have also adopted preference stat-
utes." State preference laws, however, exist in only about half of
the states. 17 For example, in Massachusetts, there is no state
statute providing that a trustee can recover a payment made in
preference to a particular creditor. 8
In those states that have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act,19 however, there is a provision which provides that
if a preferential payment is made in respect of an antecedent
debt to an insider within one year before the time that the action
is brought, 2° and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that
the entity was insolvent when the transfer was made,"' then the
transfer may be violable." There are several issues that are
buried in that sequence of principles.
Significantly, what is an insider and, more specifically, what
is an insider of a charitable corporation? The definition in Sec-
tion 1 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act mentions a
"person in control of the debtor,"2 which means, at the very
least, that someone who clearly controls an entity is an insider.24
If you have a corporation sole and the bishop is the sole member
of the corporation sole, and the bishop is also, for example, a
member of the board of directors of another entity, is the corpo-
ration sole an insider of the other entity? Is the other entity an
" See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Cor-
porate Bankruptcy, 72 TEx. L. REV. 471, 556-57 (1994) (showing national survey
which shows twenty-two states having adopted general preference statutes). Com-
mentators have suggested that the purpose of state preference laws is to reach pref-
erences that might otherwise escape federal scrutiny. See David G. Carlson, Secu-
rity Interests in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211,
358.
17 See Skeel, supra note 16, at 556-57.
" See id. at 557.
'9 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (1986).
0 Id. § 9(c).
21 Id. § 5(f).
22 Id. § 7(a).
"3 Id. § 1(7)(ii)(C).
24 See Matter of Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458, 1465 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating
that "the Bankruptcy Code and case law precedent stand for the proposition that
control is a sufficient basis for insider status."); accord Stoumbos v. Kilimnik, 988
F.2d 949, 959 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 867 (1993).
DIOCESAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
insider of the corporation sole? This is a factual question that
could be decided either way."
Nevertheless, the possibility that there will be a future at-
tack on a transfer based on the preference analysis or even on
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is not necessarily a reason
to avoid making changes in the documentation to reflect more
accurately the relationship between the corporation sole and the
other entity.
LOAN FUNDS
In most situations, a diocesan loan fund is perceived as a
kind of separate entity. Indeed, most parishes believe that, if
they have money on deposit in such a fund, those funds are
really their parish's money, like a bank account, and they want
to be satisfied that it is available to their parish." Similar funds
include clergy benefit funds, educational activities, endowment
and fundraising activities, cemetery management, and sepa-
rately, hospitals and nursing homes. If the corporation sole is
the "bank," then the funds are funds of the corporation sole, not
the parish, and the parish is just another creditor of the corpo-
ration sole. The best way to protect such funds is to incorporate
separately the diocesan loan fund.
The first step in evaluating the benefits a multiple corpora-
tion structure can have on the diocesan loan fund is to survey
the state's non-profit corporation law, in particular, the Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporations Act.27 However, since non-profit
statutes vary from state to state,28 the survey should assess the
2 "Insider" is defined under federal law in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. §
101(31) (Supp. V 1993). Congress amended Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy
Code to specifically limit voidable preferences to situations where the insider him-
self stands to benefit in response to Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874
F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (penalizing creditor who dealt with insider). See generally
David I. Adelman, Comment, Who is an "Insider" After the 1984 Amendments to Sec-
tion 547(b)(4)(B)?, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 195 (1987).
26 See David F. Menz, et al., FDIC/Cash Management, 35 CATH. LAW. 243, 256
(1994).
27 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1988). The RMNCA was adopted by
the Subcommittee on the Model Nonprofit Corporation Law of the Business Law
Section, American Bar Association, in the summer of 1987. The revised act is based
on the Model Nonprofit Corporations Act of 1954 and thirty-seven states have en-
acted the revised version. See Brenda Boykin, The Nonprofit Corporation in North
Carolina; Recognizing a Right to Member Derivative Suits, 63 N.C. L. REV. 999,
1001 n.14 (1985).
"s See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5002-12000 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. NOT-FOR-
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variations in the forms of structures that may be established.
For example, under the Act, the board of directors can be estab-
lished as the sole governing entity of a nonprofit corporation."
Similarly, under the Act, a corporation can opt out of the provi-
sions that provide rights or powers to members,3 ° limit the mem-
bers' rights to inspect and copy records,31 and eliminate the right
to vote on article amendments or the right to special meetings."
The board can elect successors to itself and certain parties can be
ex officio members of the board.3   Even where the bishop ap-
points members or the bishop himself sits on the board, a sepa-
rate non-profit corporation or entity should be considered dis-
tinct from the corporation sole.34 By structuring the diocesan
loan fund as such a distinct entity, the risk to the funds of the
separate parishes can be reduced.
Indeed, separate incorporation of parishes is a further step
to protect such assets, and the assets of the diocesan entity. One
particular diocese has long had separate corporations for its
parishes, established in an act of the Massachusetts state legis-
lature dating from the 1870s, which predated the corporation
sole statute.35 The statute had a provision that the members of
the board were to be the bishop, the vicar general, the pastor and
several lay members. 6 A similar structure has been used to es-
tablish other corporations for particular purposes, for example, a
separate corporation for the inter-parish loan fund.
Plate v. St. Mary Help of Christians Church37 illustrates the
benefits of multiple corporate structures. Plate involved a tragic
situation where a toddler was playing in a cemetery and a stone
fell over and crushed the toddler. A wrongful death action was
brought by the parents of the toddler against the parish, the
PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 100-1411 (McKinney 1995).
29 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.
30 Id. at § 6.
3' Id. at § 16.
32 Id. at § 2.
" Id. at § 8.14 See Catherine M. Knight, Comment, Must God Regulate Religious Corpora-
tions? A Proposal for Reform of the Religious Corporation Provisions of the Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 42 EMORY L.J. 721, 724 (1993) (describing corpo-
ration sole as placing all corporate powers and duties in hands of single person, such
as the bishop).
" MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 67 § 44 (West 1988) (first enacted in 1879).
36 id.
3' 520 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. App. 1994).
31 Id. at 18.
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cemetery board of the parish, and the diocese.39 The court re-
fused to find that an agency relationship existed between the
parish and the diocese and upheld the trial court's directed ver-
dict in favor of the diocese.4 Under the structure in Minnesota,
parishes are separately incorporated, but the bishop, the vicar
general, the parish priest, and two lay members are the mem-
bers of the boards.4' Even though the bishop, the vicar general,
and the parish priest were on the governing board, evidence
showed that the bishop and the vicar generally never attended
meetings and left the parish priest to run the parish himself.42
Neither the existence of a voluntary insurance fund nor a volun-
tary loan fund persuaded the court to conclude that the parish
was in fact an agent of the diocese.43 Based, in part, on the
structure of the organization, the court held that the diocese
should not be held liable for the torts of the parish."
Although it may be preferable to provide separate corporate
structures where, for example, the bishop does not appoint the
board or the bishop is not a board member, the diocese may not
be comfortable with such a structure. As the Plate case illus-
trates, the structure can retain a degree of ultimate control for
the diocesan authority, and still provide significant insulation
from liability.
One crucial question is whether the proposed entity will
qualify as a Section 509(a)(3) supporting organization under the
Internal Revenue Code.4" Two of the tests for 509(a)(3)(B) sup-
porting organization status depend upon direct or indirect su-
pervision and control by the supported organization of the sup-
porting organization.46 The third, which may be described as the
"operated in connection with" test47 is much more complex and
involves many more factors and considerations.
Other elements to consider include what canon law require-
ments may exist in these situations?48 What are the people in-
39 Id.
41 Plate, 520 N.W.2d at 20.




4' 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(3).
"Id. § 509(a)(3)(B).
47 Id.
4' See generally Reverend Edward L. Buelt & Charles Goldberg, Canon Law &
Civil Law Interface: Diocesan Corporations, 36 CATH. LAW. 69 (1995); J. Michael
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volved comfortable with? What does the bishop feel comfortable
doing? How great is the bishop's need to maintain some control?
To what extent does history dictate very active participation by
the bishop?
PENSION FUNDS
Another inter-diocesan arrangement that may be adversely
impacted by insolvency is a pension fund. Issues to consider in-
clude what is the relationship of the pension plan to an insolvent
business organization, or alternatively and completely distinct,
what is the relationship of the pension fund to the individual
beneficiary's creditors? Can the creditors reach the individual's
rights under a pension plan?
Generally, in a business context, creditors of a corporation
are not able to reach assets in an employee pension plan which is
established using a separate trust or some other separate vehi-
cle.49 If a corporation, however, simply establishes a separate
fund earmarked for the purpose of paying pensions in the long
term, that fund is at risk in a bankruptcy of the corporation. °
From a creditors' rights point of view, the crucial issue is
whether the fund is a separate entity. This depends on whether
the plan is a qualified plan or an unqualified plan and whether
there is some form of current taxation to the beneficiaries, all of
which are complex issues."
How to protect the pension fund? The best method is the
use of a qualified plan. But if the bishop desires to retain more
control, or is unwilling to meet I.R.S. requirements for qualifica-
tion (such as relatively short term vesting), other structures may
be of some help, although they are not "bullet-proof." In one
situation, a diocesan structure included a corporation which had
a long history as a corporation separate from the corporation
sole. In fact, the corporation had owned and operated the dioce-
san seminary, but was inactive at the point in time when the
pension issue came to be addressed. To provide some protection
Fitzgerald, The Official Catholic Directory: Civil and Canon Law Requirements, 30
CATH. LAW. 107 (1986).
"' See generally Jeffrey Raley, Note, The ERISA Exclusion: Shielding Assets
From Creditors in the Bankruptcy Estate, 28 TULSA L.J. 893 (1993).
50 Cf In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasizing issue of
control); In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (same).
" See Matter of Sims, 994 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049
(1994); In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
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for clergy benefits, while at the same time maintaining what the
bishop believed was necessary in terms of control over the vest-
ing of benefits and several other complex issues, this separate
pre-existing corporation was used as the vehicle to hold the
clergy pension fund which had previously been held by the cor-
poration sole. The separate corporation assumed the pension li-
ability and the assets which had been held separately, but in its
own name, by the corporation sole to provide the benefits were
transferred to the separate corporation in consideration of that
assumption of liability. This is by no means the optimum solu-
tion and may be the weakest of the various solutions that may be
considered.
INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS
The subject of vehicles used to hold investment assets is a
concept that many religious organizations have yet to consider;
however, there are some S.E.C. private letter rulings relating to
Catholic organizations in various parts of the United States
which describe such structures and confirm the availability of
exemption from S.E.C. regulation for them. From the creditors'
rights point of view, there are some real benefits in having a
captive mutual fund as the vehicle that will handle the common
investments of the separate entities and organizations within a
diocese. The captive mutual funds provide a definition for the
separate assets of the separate entities. If accounts are com-
mingled under the control of a corporation sole, what belongs to
separate entities as opposed to the corporation sole is very diffi-
cult to define. Investment vehicles are a means of formalizing a
relationship and defining the separate interests of the separate
entities."
The second impact from a creditors' rights point of view is
that it takes the risk of prejudgment remedy-the risk of seques-
tration of those assets as a pressure tactic-off the table. Mu-
tual funds, because they have stockholders' equity and virtually
no other liabilities, are essentially passive vehicles.53 They do
52 See RICHARD C. DORF, THE NEW MUTUAL FUND INVESTMENT ADVISOR 32-33
(1986); see also KURT BROUWER, MUTUAL FUNDS: HOW TO INVEST WITH THE PROS
22-23 (1988).
"3 From an individual investor's standpoint, a mutual fund represents a passive
investment; however, many types of mutual fund portfolios are actively managed.
For a discussion on the different types of mutual funds and their management ten-
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not engage in personal counseling, education, driving cars, etc.
They do not engage in any activity involving human beings at all;
they are simply investment vehicles. These entities have much
less chance of incurring liability because they are passive,54 and
thus, carry less risk that creditors will be able to obtain a pre-
judgment remedy which impacts their assets.
The situation is quite different if, for example, the corpora-
tion sole is simply holding funds for other entities, and investing
them in a common pool. A prejudgment remedy against the cor-
poration sole could prevent strategic changes in the investments
in a pool held in its name and could make it difficult to buy and
sell assets when it's appropriate to do so to protect the overall
value of the pool. An investment pool becomes a very rigid struc-
ture once it has been subject to an attachment or an injunction
or anything else that prevents buying and selling of those as-
sets.55 At best, one may need to get court permission to buy and
sell the assets.
Having a separate passive investment vehicle, in effect a
captive mutual fund, means that if one of the "stockholders" be-
comes subject to financial difficulty, the shareholder's creditor
can only reach the shareholder's shares or interests in the sepa-
rate mutual fund.56 When the captive mutual fund is estab-
lished, its by-laws and other rules can limit the circumstances
under which its shares can be transferred or redeemed. Gener-
ally, in the context of captive fund for dioceses, it is not a closed-
end fund where the stockholder can transfer the shares to a
third party, but is the kind of private fund in which investors are
only permitted to redeem their interests at certain times. The
by-laws may provide that a participant may withdraw funds, but
only after giving sufficient notice to enable the fund managers to
make the fund as liquid as necessary without selling assets in a
bad market or taking other such steps that would adversely im-
pact the value of the overall fund.
Such a vehicle greatly reduces the risks that the assets of
one entity will be held liable to satisfy the creditors of another
dencies, see JEROME B. COHEN ET AL., INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT 624-29 (5th ed., 1987).
14 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 53, at 586-89 (discussing advantages and disad-
vantages of active and passive portfolio management).
" Attachments and injunctive orders to freeze assets are usually given in ex-
tremely limited circumstances. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.1 (1993).
s' See HOWARD L. OLECK, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 31 (1986).
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entity. Although these structures seem complex, they are com-
monly utilized and are not particularly difficult to administer.
RESTRICTED GIFTS
The last subject of discussion is the law of restricted gifts in
the context of insolvent charitable organizations. In The Bible
Speaks,57 there were three or four separate bank accounts which
were the proceeds of gifts that had been given for special pur-
poses by various persons. Under the law of certain states, assets
derived from gifts given for a restrictive purpose are not gener-
ally available to satisfy the claims of all creditors of the charita-
ble entity. If a gift is given in an unrestricted way-money given
to the collection plate on Sunday morning-then the gift is gen-
erally available to satisfy creditors. In the first instance, a
clearly defined separate fund may be protected from claims of
creditors.
Despite all of the be3t efforts to establish and operate legally
separate entities, the existence of a measure of common control
in the bishop leaves open the possibility that all of the distinct
entities will be treated as "one ball of wax" by virtue of theories,
such as piercing the corporate veil and other doctrines, such as
enterprise liability. The doctrine of restricted gifts may be used
as a back-up to the idea of separate incorporation. In addition to
establishing separate corporate entities, one can define the pur-
poses of those entities clearly, probably more specifically than
one would normally want to. Most modern corporation statutes,
both business and nonprofit, permit the statement of purpose to
be quite general.58 There is, however, an asset protection benefit
in defining the statement of purpose narrowly. In soliciting
gifts, for example, those separate corporations with a fairly spe-
cific understanding of how the gifts will be used may want to
limit their organizational statement of purpose. A creditor of the
corporation sole may try to tap into an endowment fund in a
separate corporation. But if there is a clear record that the sec-
ond corporation is not only a separate entity, but that the spe-
cific purpose of the second entity was the basis on which the do-
"7 The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750 (D. Mass 1988), modified, 869
F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
"8 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 102(3) (1995) ("It shall be sufficient to state
... that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for
which corporations may be organized ....").
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nors made contributions, then the doctrine of restricted gifts may
serve to insulate those assets from the claims of general credi-
tors of the "enterprise."
Archbishop Sheehan of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe men-
tioned that, when he is raising money, he tells the people that
this money is going to be used only for the present purposes of
the Church, not for the purpose of solving old problems.
Whether it is the Cardinal's appeal or the Bishop's appeal or any
other appeal, an entity should be separately incorporated and
the purposes for which those contributions are sought should be
clearly defined. It is important that the solicitation materials be
written in a way that supports the proposition that these funds
were given for separate and distinct purposes, and are therefore
not available generally for the creditors of the diocese.
A FINAL THOUGHT ABOUT DIOCESAN STATIONARY
Many diocesan letters and contracts contain the words
"Diocese of" This exposes the diocese to risk because
when you say you are something, the law most likely will treat
you as that thing. If you say it is the "Diocese of __ ," the
court is going to say, "well it is right on the stationery-it's the
Diocese of " Certainly, in bankruptcy law, under the the-
ory of consolidation of enterprises, the use of a common station-
ery or a common description of the entity, even though they may
be a parent and subsidiary, brother and sister, and so forth, may
be one of the principal factual elements used to justify consoli-
dation.59 It is also one of the principal factual elements used to
justify piercing the corporate veil6" or for establishing enterprise
liability.61
Enterprise liability, particularly from the tort liability side,
is a much broader and more difficult doctrine to contain than
piercing the corporate veil, which is typically done in the context
of business corporations, or consolidation in the context of a
bankruptcy case. But all depend upon creating an impression
" See BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALLEN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL
§§ 1.04, 1.08 (1994) (discussing treatment of subsidiary corporations in bankruptcy).
60 See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.05 (1991)
(discussing theories of piercing parent and subsidiary corporations).
'" See VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 147-54
(1995) (analyzing enterprise liability in contemporary tort theory).
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that multiple entities function as a single enterprise. Each law-
yer for the various dioceses can help the client limit their expo-
sure in this area by thinking about what the stationery should
say. When you're dealing with religious subjects, the use of sta-
tionery that states the "Diocese- of _" may be entirely ap-
propriate. When you're negotiating a legal contract, such use of
the term "Diocese of " in that context represents an addi-
tional risk.

